it could not apply to needy human beings. I discuss Bolotin's position on this "friendship" at the end of the first section of my essay. 
My essay on Plato

THE REVIEW OF POLITICS
Friendship as Philosophy
Socrates recounts to unnamed listener(s) how he meets a group of young men, among whom is the frustrated lover Hippothales. Perhaps because Hippothales has heard of Socrates' claim to expertise in matters of love (see Sym. 177e; Phdr. 227c and 257b), he asks Socrates for advice about how to endear himself to his beloved Lysis (206c).6 We might wonder whether Socrates' knowledge of erotic matters issues in the sort of advice the lover seeks, but Socrates does not object. In fact, he offers more than requested. He will demonstrate how a lover should speak to his beloved, he proposes, by talking to Lysis himself. Socrates thus offers to place his ability to refute others (Apol. 21b ff.) in the service of a lover's capturing his young man, for a humbled Lysis will become more amenable to Hippothales' advances than one puffed up by Hippothales' exaggerated songs of praise (206a; 210e 
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leave no room for reciprocity," he also suggests that the good is "in 'need' of a needy being in order for it to be useful or good."'13 There is thus a recipro city of sorts between an individual who loves his own good, say his own virtue, and the good that he loves. So, even in Socrates' move to reciprocity at the end of the dialogue, Bolotin finds confirmation that one is primarily a friend to oneself. The kindred are friends, for an individual and his own good are kindred.
Bolotin does acknowledge that those who have become good, "whose more or less lasting self-sufficiency includes the perfection of wisdom," might "even without needing one another, and longing for one another in order to become whole," still "being kindred, desire and enjoy one another's company." Theirs might be "among the purest, if not the deepest, of 'friendships'." Their friendship is pure because it is not selfish, for these friends do not need each other. And while each may delight in the company of the other, they can take it or leave it. Bolotin admits this is friendship "only in a limited sense."14 The relation of these "friends" is less deep, presumably, than a human being's love of the good for himself. In the end, self-love characterizes even the deepest recesses of the soul, including that of the philosopher, who is less deceived by "phantom" friends than others. Love alone cannot serve as this experience. To be sure, a lover needs and loves someone other than himself. As Hippothales' case illustrates, the lover Menexenus' contentiousness, but he would not find it so disconcerting if Menexenus were not his friend (see also 213d-e). It is not, then, that philosophy serves as the experience that friends ulti mately seek, free of the illusions of friendship. Rather, philosophy must find its model in the experience of friends-an experience of one's own as another who cannot be assimilated or subordinated. The whole by which we might be deceived is not an illusion that our friendships are wholes but that we ourselves are. The experience of friends offers us access to a world that must be known rather than mastered, and one that is not so radi cally different from ourselves that it must remain unknown. The friend who emerges here plays in part, but only in part, the role of the beautiful in the Symposium's account of the philosopher's ascent (Sym. 210a ff. Socrates turns to Menexenus and Lysis for help in answering his question about the friend "inasmuch as [they] are experienced" (212a). The discussion of the friend will start with their experience. It is this experience that could help the lover Hippothales, for it is love itself that must be captured by and transformed into friendship. Hippothales' own language at the outset fore shadows this, for the lover wants Socrates to advise him how to become dear (prosphiles) to his beloved (206c). He would not really be satisfied by his capture, even though he does not understand this. Like Socrates, he too is seeking a friend. The dialogue's move from his love to the friendship of the two boys reflects this possibility. 
Lysis and
